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The Future of Law and Mobility
Daniel A. Crane†

Introduction
With the launch of the new Journal of Law and Mobility,
the University of Michigan is recognizing the transformative
impact of new transportation and mobility technologies, from
cars, to trucks, to pedestrians, to drones. The coming
transition towards intelligent, automated, and connected
mobility systems will transform not only the way people and
goods move about, but also the way human safety, privacy,
and security are protected, cities are organized, machines
and people are connected, and the public and private spheres
are defined.
Law will be at the center of these transformations, as it
always is. There has already been a good deal of thinking
about the ways that law must adapt to make connected and
automated mobility feasible in areas like tort liability,
insurance, federal preemption, and data privacy. 1 But it is
also not too early to begin pondering the many implications
for law and regulation arising from the technology’s spillover
effects as it begins to permeate society. For better or worse,
connected and automated mobility will disrupt legal practices
and concepts in a variety of ways additional to the obvious
“regulation of the car.” Policing practices and Fourth
Amendment law, now so heavily centered on routine
automobile stops, will of necessity require reconsideration.
Notions of ownership of physical property (i.e., an automobile)
† Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of
Michigan. I am grateful for helpful comments from Ellen Partridge
and Bryant Walker Smith. All errors are my own.
1 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logue & Bryce Pilz, A
Survey of Legal Issues Arising from the Deployment of Autonomous
and Connected Vehicles, 23 Mich. Tel. & Tech. L. Rev. 191 (2017).
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and data (i.e., accident records) will be challenged by the
automated sharing economy.
And the economic and
regulatory structure of the transportation network will have
to be reconsidered as mobility transitions from a largely
individualistic model of drivers in their own cars pursuing
their own ends within the confines of general rules of the
road to a model in which shared and interconnected vehicles
make collective decisions to optimize the system’s
performance. In these and many other ways, the coming
mobility revolution will challenge existing legal concepts and
practices with implications far beyond the “cool new gadget of
driverless cars.”
Despite the great importance of the coming mobility
revolution, the case for a field of study in “law and mobility”
is not obvious. In this inaugural essay for the Journal of Law
and Mobility, I shall endeavor briefly to make that case.
I.

DRIVERLESS CARS AND THE LAW OF THE HORSE

A technological phenomenon can be tremendously
important to society without necessarily meriting its own field
of legal study because of what Judge Frank Easterbrook has
described as “the law of the horse” problem. 2 Writing against
the burgeoning field of “Internet law” in the early 1990s,
Easterbrook argued against organizing legal analysis around
particular technologies:
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to
specialized endeavors is to study general rules. Lots
of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with
people kicked by horses; still more deal with the
licensing and racing of horses, or with the care
veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse
shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a
course on “The Law of the Horse” is doomed to be
shallow and to miss unifying principles.3
Prominent advocates of “Internet law” as a field rebutted
Easterbrook’s concern, arguing that focusing on cyberlaw as
a field could be productive to understanding aspects of this
2 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 207, 207-16.
3 Id.
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important human endeavor in ways that merely studying
general principles might miss.4
Despite Easterbrook’s
protestation, a distinct field of cyberlaw has grown up in
recent decades.
“The law of the horse” debate seems particularly apt to
the question of law and mobility since the automobile is the
lineal successor of the horse as society’s key transportation
technology. Without attempting to offer a general solution to
the “law of the horse” question, it is worth drawing a
distinction between two different kinds of disruptive
technologies—those in which the technological change
produces social changes indirectly and without significant
possibilities for legal intervention, and those in which law is
central to the formation of the technology itself.
An example of the first species of technological change is
air conditioning. The rise of air conditioning in the midtwentieth century had tremendous effects on society,
including dramatic increases in business productivity,
changes in living patterns as people shifted indoors, and the
extension of retail store hours and hence the growing
commercialization of American culture. 5 The South’s share of
U.S. population was in steady decline until the 1960s when,
in lockstep with the growth of air conditioning and people’s
willingness to settle in hot places, the trend abruptly reversed
and the South’s share grew dramatically. 6 The political
consequences were enormous—from Richard Nixon through
George W. Bush, every elected President hailed from warm
climates.
One could say, without exaggeration, that the Willis
Carrier’s frigid contraption exerted a greater effect on
American business, culture, and politics than almost any
other invention in the twentieth century. And, yet, it would
seem silly to launch a field of study in “law and air
conditioning.” Air conditioning’s social, economic, and
political effects were largely indirect—the result of human
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1999).
5 Stan Cox, Losing Our Cool: Uncomfortable Truths About Our
Air-Conditioned World (and Finding New Ways to Get Through the
Summer) (2012).
6 Paul Krugman, Air Conditioning and the Rise of the South,
New
York
Times
March
28,
2015,
https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/airconditioning-and-the-rise-of-the-south/.
4
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decisions in response to the new circumstances created by
the new technology rather than an immediate consequence of
the technology itself. Even if regulators had foreseen the
dramatic demographic effects of air conditioning’s spread,
there is little they could have done (short of killing or limiting
the technology) to mediate the process of change by
regulating the technology.
Contrast the Internet. Like air conditioning, the Internet
has had tremendous implications for culture, business, and
politics, but unlike air conditioning, many of these effects
were artifacts of design decisions regarding the legal
architecture of cyberspace. From questions of taxation of
online commercial transactions,7 to circumvention of digital
rights management technologies,8 to personal jurisdiction
over geographically remote online interlocutors,9 and in
countless other ways, a complex of legal and regulatory
decisions created the modern Internet. From the beginning,
law was hovering over the face of cyberspace. Al Gore may
not have created the Internet, but lawyers had as much to do
with it as did engineers.
The Internet’s legal architecture was not established at a
single point in time, by a single set of actors, or with a single
set of ideological commitments or policy considerations.
Copyright structures were born of the contestation among
one set of stakeholders, which was distinct from the sets of
stakeholders contesting over tax policy, net neutrality, or
revenge porn. And yet, the decisions made in separate
regulatory spheres often interact in underappreciated ways to
lend the Internet its social and economic character. Tax
policy made Amazon dominant in retail, copyright policy
made Google dominant in search, and data protection law (or
its absence) made Facebook dominant in social media—with
the result that all three have become antitrust problems.
Whether or not law students should be encouraged to
study “Internet law” in a discrete course, it seems evident
with the benefit of thirty years of hindsight that the role of
See, e.g., John E. Sununu, The Taxation of Internet
Commerce, 39 Harv. J. Leg. 325 (2002).
8 See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Rif on Fair Use in the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000).
9 Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1821
(2003).
7
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law in mediating cyberspace cannot be adequately
comprehended without a systemic inquiry. Mobility, I would
argue, will be much the same.
While the individual
components of the coming shift toward connectivity and
automation—i.e., insurance, tort liability, indemnification,
intellectual property, federal preemption, municipal traffic
law, etc.—will have analogues in known circumstances and
hence will benefit from consideration as general questions of
insurance, torts, and so forth, the interaction of the many
moving parts will produce a novel, complex ecosystem. Given
the potential of that ecosystem to transform human life in
many significant ways, it is well worth investing some effort
in studying “law and mobility” as a comprehensive field.
II. An Illustration from Three Connected Topics
It would be foolish to attempt a description of mobility’s
future legal architecture at this early stage in the mobility
revolution. However, in an effort to provide some further
motivation for the field of “law and mobility,” let me offer an
illustration from three areas in which legal practices and
doctrines may be affected in complex ways by the shift toward
connected and automated vehicles. Although these three
topics entail consideration of separate fields of law, the
technological and legal decisions made with respect to them
could well have system-wide implications, which shows the
value of keeping the entire system in perspective as discrete
problems are addressed.
A.

Policing and Public Security

For better or for worse, the advent of automated vehicles
will redefine the way that policing and law enforcement are
conducted. Routine traffic stops are fraught, but potentially
strategically
significant,
moments
for
police-citizen
interactions. Half of all citizen-police interactions, 10 more

Samuel Walker, Science and Politics in Police Research:
Reflections on their Tangled Relationship, 593 Annals Am. Acad. Pol.
& Soc. Sci. 137, 142 (2004); ATTHEW R. DUROSE ET. AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC, 2005, 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/.
10
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than forty percent of all drug arrests,11 and over 30% of police
shootings 12 occur in the context of traffic stops. Much of the
social tension over racial profiling and enforcement inequality
has arisen in the context of police practices with respect to
minority motorists.13 The traffic stop is central to modern
policing, including both its successes and pathologies.
Will there continue to be routine police stops in a world of
automated vehicles? Surely traffic stops will not disappear
altogether, since driverless cars may still have broken
taillights or lapsed registrations.14 But with the advent of
cars programmed to follow the rules of the road, the number
of occasions for the police to stop cars will decline
significantly. As a general matter, the police need probable
cause to stop a vehicle on a roadway. 15 A world of
predominantly automated vehicles will mean many fewer
traffic violations and hence many fewer police stops and
many fewer police-citizen interactions and arrests for
evidence of crime discovered during those stops.
On the positive side, that could mean a significant
reduction in some of the abuses and racial tensions around
policing. But it could also deprive the police of a crime
detection dragnet, with the consequence either that the crime
rate will increase due to the lower detection rate or that the
police will deploy new crime detection strategies that could
create new problems of their own.
Addressing these potentially sweeping changes to the
practices of policing brought about by automated vehicle
technologies requires considering both the structure of the
relevant technology and the law itself. On the technological
side, connected and automated vehicles could be designed for
easy monitoring and controlling by the police. That could
entail a decline in privacy for vehicle occupants, but also
potentially reduce the need for physical stops by the police
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 299.
12 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972).
13 Ronnie A. Dunn, Racial Profiling: A Persistent Civil Rights
Challenge Even in the Twenty-First Century, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
957, 979 (2016) (reporting statistics on disproportionate effects on
racial minorities of routine traffic stops).
14 See John Frank Weaver, Robot, Do You Know Why I Stopped
You?,
http://www.slate.com/technology/2018/05/judge-naomireice-buchwald-rules-trump-cant-block-twitter-users.html.
15 Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
11
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(cars that can be remotely monitored can be remotely
ticketed) and hence some of the police-citizen roadside
friction that has dominated recent troubles.
On the legal side, the advent of connected and automated
vehicles will require rethinking the structure of Fourth
Amendment law as required to automobiles. At present,
individual rights as against searches and seizures often rely
on distinctions between drivers and passengers, or owners
and occupants. For example, a passenger in a car may
challenge the legality of the police stop of a car, 16 but have
diminished expectations of privacy in the search of the
vehicle’s interior if they are not the vehicle’s owners or
bailees. 17 In a mobility fleet without drivers and (as discussed
momentarily) perhaps without many individual owners, these
conceptions of the relationship of people to cars will require
reconsideration.
B.

Ownership, Sharing, and the Public/Private Divide

In American culture, the individually owned automobile
has historically been far more than a transportation device—
it has been an icon of freedom, mobility, and personal
identity. As Ted McAllister has written concerning the growth
of automobile culture in the early twentieth century:
The automobile squared perfectly with a
distinctive American ideal of freedom—freedom
of mobility. Always a restless nation, with
complex migratory patterns throughout the 17th,
18th, and 19th centuries, the car came just as a
certain kind of mobility had reached an end
with the closing of the frontier. But the
restlessness had not ended, and the car allowed
control of space like no other form of
transportation. 18

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
18 Ted v. McAllister, Cars, Individualism, and the Paradox of
Freedom
in
a
Mass
Society,
https://www.frontporchrepublic.com/2011/10/cars-individualismand-the-paradox-of-freedom-in-a-mass-society/.
16
17
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Individual car ownership has long been central to
conceptions of property and economic status. The average
American adult currently spends about ten percent of his or
her income on an automobile,19 making it by far his or her
most expensive item of personal property. The social costs of
individual automobile ownership are far higher. 20
The automobile’s run as an icon of social status through
ownership may be ending.
Futurists expect that the
availability of on-demand automated vehicle service will
complete the transition from mobility as personal property to
mobility as a service, as more and more households stop
buying cars and rely instead on ride sharing services.21 Ride
sharing companies like Uber and Lyft have long been on this
case, and now automobile manufacturers are scrambling to
market their vehicles as shared services.22 With the decline
of individual ownership, what will happen to conceptions of
property in the physical space of the automobile, in the
contractual right to use a particular car or fleet of
automobiles, and in the data generated about occupants and
vehicles?
The coming transition from individual ownership to
shared service will also raise important questions about the
line between the public and private domains. At present, the
“public sphere” is defined by mass transit whereas the
individually owned automobile constitutes the “private
sphere.” The public sphere operates according to ancient
19 Máté Petrány, This Is How Much Americans Spend on their
Cars, https://jalopnik.com/this-is-how-much-americans-spend-ontheir-cars-1596515156.
20 Edward Humes, The Absurd Primacy of the Automobile in
American
Life,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/absurdprimacy-of-the-car-in-american-life/476346/; Robert Moor, What
Happens to the American Myth When You Take the Driver Out of It?,
http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/10/is-the-self-driving-car-unamerican.html.
21
Smart Cities and the Vehicle Ownership Shift,
https://www.automotiveworld.com/analysis/smart-cities-vehicleownership-shift/.
22 Ryan Felton, GM Aims to Get Ahead of Everyone with
Autonomous Ride-Sharing Service in Multiple Cities by 2019,
https://jalopnik.com/gm-aims-to-get-ahead-of-everyone-withautonomous-ride-s-1820886131.
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common carrier rules of universal access and nondiscrimination, whereas a car is not quite “a man’s castle on
wheels” for constitutional purposes,23 but still a non-public
space dominated by individual rights as against the state
rather than public obligations. 24 As more and more vehicles
are held and used in shared fleets rather than individual
hands, the traditional line between publicly minded “mass
transit” and individually minded vehicle ownership will come
under pressure, with significant consequences for both
efficiency and equality.
C. Platform Mobility, Competition, and Regulation
The coming transition toward ride sharing fleets rather
than individual vehicle ownership described in the previous
section will have additional important implications for the
economic structure of mobility—which of course will raise
important regulatory questions as well. At present, the
private transportation system is highly atomistic. In the
United States alone, there are 264 million individually owned
motor vehicles in operation. 25 For the reasons previously
identified, expect many of these vehicles to shift toward
corporate-owned fleets in coming years. The question then
will be how many such fleets will operate—whether we will
see robust fleet-to-fleet competition or instead the
convergence toward a few dominant providers as we are
seeing in other important areas of the “platform economy.”
There is every reason to believe that, before too long,
mobility will tend in the direction of other monopoly or
oligopoly platforms because it will share their economic
structure.
The key economic facts behind the rise of
dominant platforms like Amazon, Twitter, Google, Facebook,
See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle.”).
24 E.g., Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
the motor vehicle license plates were nonpublic fora and that state’s
ban on vanity plates referencing religious topic violated First
Amendment).
25 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Transportation Energy Data Book,
Chapter 8, Household Vehicles and Characteristics, Table 8.1,
Population
and
Vehicle
Profile,
https://cta.ornl.gov/data/chapter8.shtml (last visited May 29,
2018).
23
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Microsoft, and Apple are the presence of scale economies and
network effects—system attributes that make the system
more desirable for others users as new users join. 26 In the
case of the mobility revolution, a number of features are
suggestive of future scale economies and network effects.
The more cars in a fleet, the more likely it is that one will be
available when summoned by a user.27 The more cars
connected to other cars in a fleet, the higher the quality of the
information (on such topics as road and weather conditions
and vehicle performance) available within the fleet and the
steeper the machine learning curve.
As is true with other platforms, the mere presence of
scale economic and network effects does not have to lead
inexorably to market concentration or monopoly. Law and
regulation may intervene to mitigate these effects, for example
by requiring information sharing or interconnection among
rival platforms. But such mandatory information sharing or
interconnection obligations are not always advisable, as they
can diminish a platform’s incentives to invest in its own
infrastructure or otherwise impair incentives to compete.
Circling back to the “law of the horse” point raised at
the outset, these issues are not, of course, unique to law and
mobility. But this brief examination of these three topics—
policing, ownership, and competition—shows the value of
considering law and mobility as a distinct topic.
Technological, legal, and regulatory decisions we make with
respect to one particular set of problems will have
implications for distinct problems perhaps not under
consideration at that moment.
For example, law and
technology will operate conjunctively to define the bounds of
privacy expectations in connected and automated vehicles,
with implications for search and seizure law, property and
data privacy norms, and sharing obligations to promote
competition. Pulling a “privacy lever” in one context—say to
safeguard against excessive police searches—could have
See generally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A
Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, Antitrust, Spring
1996, at 36; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition
and Network Effects, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 93 (1994).
26

This should hold even though a larger fleet would also mean
more subscribers, since the average distance between a user and an
available vehicle should decline with an increase in the fleet’s
market penetration.
27
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spillover effects in another context, for example by bolstering
a dominant mobility platform’s arguments against mandatory
data sharing. Although the interactions between the different
technological decisions and related legal norms are surely
impossible to predict or manage with exactitude,
consideration of law and mobility as a system will permit a
holistic view of this complex, evolving ecosystem.
Conclusion
Law and regulation will be at the center of the coming
mobility revolution. Many of the patterns we will observe at
the intersection of law and the new technologies will be
familiar—at least if we spend the time to study past
technological revolutions—and general principles will be
sufficient to answer many of the rising questions. At the
same time, there is a benefit to considering the field of law
and mobility comprehensively with an eye to understanding
the often subtle interactions between discrete technological
and legal decisions. The Journal of Law and Mobility aims to
play an important role in this fast-moving space.

